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This	 paper	 is	 an	 exploration	 of	 the	 prospects	 of	 rationalist,	 concept-based	 epistemologies	 of	
modality	as	far	as	essentialist	and	de	re	modal	claims	are	concerned.	I	grant	certain	explanatory	
power	to	such	epistemologies	but,	primarily,	 I	 identify	 their	 limitations.	 I	 first	explore	 them	in	
view	of	 the	 (possible)	 existence	of	general	 as	well	 as	of	 singular	modally	 loaded	 concepts	 and	
find	 their	 explanatory	 scope	 severely	 limited.	 Inspired	 by	 the	 abstractionist’s	 concept-and-







an	 exploration	 of	 this	 question.	 The	 question	 belongs	 to	 the	 epistemology	 of	 (metaphysical)	
modality	in	general	but	it	belongs,	more	specifically,	to	the	epistemology	of	de	re	modality.		
	 For	 current	 purposes,	 modality	 de	 dicto	 speaks	 of	 the	 different	 modes—necessarily,	
contingently,	 or	 possibly—in	which	 a	general	 truth	 (or	 falsity)	 is	 true	 (or	 false).	 The	 general	
claims	‘all	vixens	are	female’	and	‘there	are	talking	donkeys’,	for	instance,	can	be	prefixed	with	
any	of	 three	modal	operators	 referring	 to	 those	 three	modes.	When	so	prefixed,	 the	 resulting	
modal	 claims	are	de	dicto;	 for	 instance	 ‘Necessarily,	 all	vixens	are	 female’	and	 ‘Possibly,	 there	
are	 talking	 donkeys’.1	 Modality	 de	 re,	 by	 contrast,	 speaks	 of	 the	 modes—again:	 necessarily,	
contingently,	or	possibly—in	which	entities	stand	in	relations	(or	hold	properties).	Socrates,	for	
instance,	 holds	 the	 property	 of	 being	 human.	 The	 claims	 ‘Socrates	 is	 necessarily	 human’	 says	
(truly	 or	 falsely),	 that	 he	 holds	 it	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 necessity	 whereas	 the	 claim	 ‘Socrates	 is	
contingently	 human’	 says	 (again	 truly	 or	 falsely)	 that	 he	 holds	 it	 contingently	 (and	 therefore	
implies	 that	 he	 could	 exist	 being	 other	 than	 human).	 Similarly,	 for	 a	 given	 human	 zygote	 z,	
Socrates	also	stands	 in	 the	relation	of	originates	 from	with	 it.	The	de	re	modal	claim	 ‘Socrates	
                                                      
















At	 an	 ontological	 level,	 therefore,	 the	 essential	 facts	 about	 a	 given	 entity	 imply	 the	 de	 re	
necessities	 involving	it	and	those,	 in	turn,	determine	the	space	of	possibilities	for	 it.	 	 It	 is	very	
tempting	to	suggest	on	this	basis	what	I	will	call	‘a	mirroring	epistemology	of	modality’.	There’s	
room	 for	more	 and	 less	 extreme	 variants	 of	 such	 epistemologies	 but,	 crudely,	 according	 to	 a	
mirroring	 epistemology	of	modality,	 the	 epistemic	priority	order	mirrors	 the	ontological	 one:	
knowledge	of	essence	grounds	knowledge	of	de	re	necessities,	 from	which	knowledge	of	de	re	
possibilities	(as	those	determined	to	be	compatible	with	the	de	re	necessities)	is	derived.3		
	 Despite	 the	 (Finean)	 ontological	 distinction,	 essential	 facts	 and	 necessities	 de	 re	 are	 not	
different	from	an	epistemological	perspective:	our	epistemic	access	to	them	poses	broadly	the	
same	 puzzle.	 Because	 of	 this,	 and	 remaining	 neutral	 on	 both	 the	 ontological	 picture	 and	 the	
mirroring	 epistemology,	 I	 will	 not	 distinguish	 between	 them	 in	 this	 paper.	 The	 focus	 of	 the	
discussion	 is	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 nature	 of	 our	 concepts	 might	 help	 us	 to	 explain	 our	
epistemic	access	to	essential	facts	(and	de	re	necessities	and	possibilities).			
	 The	 main	 thesis	 to	 be	 defended	 is	 that	 concepts	 have	 a	 very	 limited	 role	 to	 play	 in	 the	
epistemology	of	de	re	modality.	The	dialectical	relevance	of	this	thesis	stems	from	the	fact	that	
many	modal	epistemologists	hold	a	concept-based	epistemology	of	essence	(on	which	to	build	
the	 mirroring	 epistemology	 of	 de	 re	 modality).	 They	 believe	 that	 our	 epistemic	 access	 to	
essential	truths	is	intimately	tied	to	knowledge	of	conceptual	truths.	On	this	basis,	de	re	modal	
knowledge—taken	 as	 derivative	 from	 essentialist	 knowledge—is	 believed	 to	 be	
(fundamentally)	 a	 priori	 because	 its	 ultimate	 (essentialist)	 premises	 would	 be	 somehow	
analytic	or	conceptual.4,5	I	show	however	that,	even	if	some	explanatory	power	is	to	be	granted	










to	 the	 nature	 of	 concepts,	 these	 epistemologies	 are	 not	 delivering	 adequately	 vis-à-vis	 the	
agenda	 of	 the	 modal	 epistemologist.	 This	 agenda—which	 will	 be	 fully	 characterised	 in	 due	
course—includes	 the	 tasks	 of	 explaining	 our	 epistemic	 access	 to	 de	 dicto	 necessities,	 to	
essentialist	principles,	to	particular	essential	truths,	and	to	de	re	possibilities;	and	the	nature	of	
concepts	contributes	to	fulfilling	a	very	small	portion	of	it.	
	 The	 dialectical	 impact	 of	 this	 result	 is	 not	 insignificant.	 The	 label	 ‘concept-based	
epistemology	 of	 modality’	 covers	 a	 family	 of	 views	 that	 can	 differ	 quite	 substantially	 among	
them.	 Bealer’s	 intuition-based	 epistemology	 (e.g.,	 2002,	 2004),	 for	 instance,	 in	 taking	 the	
relevant	modal	intuitions	as	speaking	of	conceptual	relations,	is	a	representative	of	the	family.	
So	is	Chalmers’s	conceivability-based	account	(mostly	in	2002),	in	virtue	of	taking	the	relevant	
notions	 of	 conceivability	 to	 be	 appropriately	 tied	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 concepts.	 Peacocke’s	
Principle-Based	account	 (1999)	 is	 also	 a	 salient	 representative;	 and	 so	 is	 the	 epistemology	of	
(conventional)	 modal	 truths	 as	 put	 forward	 by	 Sidelle	 (1989).	 A	 proper	 appreciation	 of	 the	




that	 both	 (i)	 is	 committed	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 de	 re	 modal	 knowledge	 and	 (ii)	 rests	 its	
rationalism	on	the	nature	of	concepts.	The	resulting	diagnosis	will	be	that	if	we	have	de	re	modal	




of	modally	 loaded	 concepts;	 the	 serious	 candidates	 to	 playing	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 a	 concept-
based	 epistemologies	 of	 essence.	 Modally	 loaded	 concepts	 are	 concepts	 whose	 application	
conditions	 include	modal	 conditions	 and,	 as	 such,	 they	 require	 a	 certain	modal	 profile	 of	 the	
entities	 that	 fall	 under	 them.	 I	 distinguish	 between	 general	 modally	 loaded	 concepts	 and	
singular	 modally	 loaded	 concepts	 and,	 by	 means	 of	 examples,	 I	 scrutinize	 their	 cases	
separately—respectively,	 in	 §2	 and	 §3.	 The	 results	 will	 be	 partly	 concessive	 but	 mostly	











negative.	 As	 for	 the	 concessive	 bit:	 the	 very	 existence	 of	 modally	 loaded	 concepts	 generates	
certain	 conceptual	 essential	 truths	 and	 our	 access	 to	 them	 is,	 on	 occasions,	 explainable	 in	 a	
concept-based	 manner.7	 However,	 those	 explanations	 only	 cover	 an	 unsatisfactorily	 small	
portion	of	the	agenda	of	the	modal	epistemologist.		
	 In	 an	attempt	not	 to	underestimate	 the	explanatory	power	of	modally	 loaded	 concepts,	 §4	
focuses	on	hybrid	strategies.	The	inspirational	model	is	the	abstractionism	of	Hale	and	Wright,	
whose	crucial	elements	are	 the	(modally	 loaded)	singular	concepts	 forged	by	abstraction.	The	
view	is	hybrid	in	that	it	is	both	concept-	and	entitlement-based.	The	account	looks	promising	for	
their	 subject	 matter	 but,	 regardless,	 I	 note	 its	 scope-limitations:	 it	 applies	 only	 to	 the	
abstractionist’s	abstracta.	 I	thus	set	aside	the	assessment	of	the	view	and,	instead,	I	submit	for	
exploration	 a	 different	 hybrid	 strategy;	 one	 that	 is	 seemingly	 also	 concept-	 and	 entitlement-
based	 but	 that,	 unlike	 the	 abstractionist’s	 one,	 can	 be	 made	 as	 general	 as	 one	 deems	











I	 shall	 make	 this	 assumption	 here.	 The	 assumption,	 roughly,	 is	 that	 (some)	 concepts	 are	
individuated	 partly	 by	 certain	 contents,	 and	 that	 the	 contents	 that	 serve	 to	 individuate	 a	
concept	C	also	serve	to	individuate	C’s	possession	conditions.	In	addition,	when	the	concept	at	
issue	 is	 not	 recognitional,	 the	 contents	 that	 serve	 to	 individuate	 it	 are	 knowable	
(fundamentally)	a	priori	by	C–possessors	(with	more	or	less	effort).	This	view	of	concepts	is	not	
uncontroversial.8	 However,	 it	 is	 arguably	 one	 of	 the	 few	 views	 that	 are	 well	 positioned	 to	
explain	a	priori	knowledge	in	general	(other	than	by	claiming	it	innate	or	else	an	output	of	non-
concept-based	 intuitions).	 If	 this	 assumption	 on	 concepts	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 incorrect,	 the	
prospects	of	modal	rationalism	will	be	correspondingly	worsened.	I	wish	to	remain	neutral	on	
this	assumption.	The	paper	 is	confined	to	putting	an	upper	bound	to	the	best	case	scenario:	 if	





















the	 non-modal	 application	 conditions	 that	 these	 three	 concepts	 share.	 So	 a	 falls	 under	





















loaded	concepts	and	 to	reflect	appropriately	on	 them.	That	 is,	we	need	 to	possess	concepts—
like	<human+>	and	<human–>—whose	application	conditions	require	a	certain	modal	profile	of	
the	entities	that	fall	under	them.		
	 Not	 all	 concepts	 are	modally	 loaded,	 though.	<human*>	 is	not,	 and	no	 conceptual	network	
that	contained	it	would	per	se	encode	any	of	the	following:11	
	 (EO*)	 ∀x(H*x	→	∀y(Oxy	→	!Oxy))	 	
	 (¬EO*)	 ∀y(H*x	→	∀y(Oxy	→	¬!Oxy))	
Knowledge	that	a	is	human*	is	thus	neutral	as	to	whether	a	has	her	origins	essentially	or	not.		
	 The	 four	principles	above	are	all	 essentialist	principles:	 they	are	principles	 consequents	of	
instances	 of	 which	 either	 say	 or	 deny,	 of	 a	 given	 entity,	 x,	 that	 a	 given	 origin-property	 is	
essential	 to	 it.	 But	 while	 (EO+)	 and	 (¬EO–)	 are	 conceptual	 essentialist	 principles,	 (EO*)	 and	
(¬EO*)	are	(whether	true	or	false)	non-conceptual	essentialist	principles:	they	cannot	be	known	
to	be	true	by	mere	possession	of	concepts.	Whether	true	or	false,	they	are	so	in	virtue	of	facts	










	 I	 consider	 the	 preceding	 paragraphs	 sufficient	 to	 illustrate	 the	 distinction	 between	
conceptual	 and	 non-conceptual	 essentialist	 principles.	 A	 further	 difference	 to	 be	 drawn	 (and	
used	shortly)	 is	 that	between	essentialist	principles	and	particular	essential	 truths	 (or	essential	
truths	about	particular	 individuals).	The	claim	┌x	 is	essentially	F┐	 is	a	non-general	essentialist	
claim.	 Particular	 essential	 truths	 (about	 a	 given	 individual)	 are	 expressible	with	 non-general	
essentialist	claims	like	that.			
	 So	 far,	 I	 have	 granted	 the	 (a	 priori)	 concept-based	 knowability	 of	 conceptual	 essentialist	
principles	 like	 (EO+)	 and	 (¬EO–).	And	despite	 being	 conceptual,	 these	principles	 involve	de	 re	












explicit	 knowability	 of	 essentialist	 principles	 like	 (EO+)	 and	 (¬EO–)	 can	 be	 elucidated	 in	 a	
concept-based	fashion.	Some	explanatory	power	as	far	as	essentialist	claims	are	concerned	must	






epistemologist:	 elucidating	 the	 knowability	 conditions	 of	 de	 dicto	 modal	 truths,	 of	 non-
conceptual	 essentialist	principles,	of	 (non-conceptual)	particular	essential	 truths,	and	of	 (non-
conceptual)	de	 re	possibilities.	Accordingly,	 in	 order	 to	 assess	 the	 significance	of	 the	 credited	









in	 the	knowability	 conditions	of	 conceptual	 truths.	This	 is	 so	due	 to	 the	 facts,	 first,	 that	 these	
necessities	 result	 from	modalizing	 a	 conceptual	 truth	with	 a	 necessity	 operator;	 and,	 second,	
that	our	judgement	that	a	given	thought	is	a	conceptual	truth	arguably	grounds	our	assenting	to	
the	 result	 of	 modalizing	 it	 with	 a	 necessity	 operator.	 To	 this	 extent,	 the	 fact	 that	 we	 can	
elucidate	 our	 epistemic	 access	 to	 conceptual	 essentialist	 principles	 like	 (EO+)	 and	 (¬EO–)	 in	 a	
concept-based	 fashion	 contributes	 to	 our	 elucidation	 of	 the	 knowability	 conditions	 of	 the	 de	





will	 not,	 even	 when	 explicit,	 help	 us	 acquire	 particular	 essentialist	 knowledge	 (like	 as	 to	
whether	a	given	individuals’	origins	are	essential	to	her).	As	a	result,	the	task	of	elucidating	the	
knowability	 conditions	 of	 the	 latter	 will	 not	 be	 eased	 by	 our	 having	 available	 at	 all	 an	
elucidation	(let	alone	concept-based)	of	the	knowability	conditions	of	the	former.	This	negative	
result	will	easily	extend	to	the	case	of	non-conceptual	essentialist	principles.		
	 Suppose	 there	 is	 an	 organism	 in	 front	 of	 me.	 Let’s	 call	 it	 ‘a’.	 Assume—for	 easiness	 of	
reasoning—that	 I	 know	 it	 is	 a	 (female)	 human*.	 Suppose	 also	 that	 I	 (reasonably)	 want	 to	
acquire	(first-hand)	knowledge	as	to	whether	a’s	origins	are	essential	to	her.12	Neither	explicit	
knowledge	of	(EO+)	nor	of	(¬EO–)	will	be	of	help	in	answering	this	essentialist	question	about	a’s	
origins.	 These	 two	 conceptual	 principles	 are	 universal	 quantifications.	 It	 is	 a	 truism	 that	
knowledge	of	∀x(Px	→	Qx)	is	not	by	itself	sufficient	to	put	us	in	a	position	to	know	that	Qa	for	
any	given	a	 that	 is	 in	 fact	Q.	 In	order	 to	acquire	knowledge	that	Qa	via	a	deductive	route	 that	





































deductive	 routes	 above	 is	 to	 say	 the	 futility	 that	 we	 can	 acquire	 (first	 hand)	 knowledge	 of	
whether	a’s	origins	are	essential	 to	her	by	having	acquired	 (first	hand)	knowledge	of	whether	
a’s	origins	are	essential	to	her.14		
	 Ultimately,	 the	 reason	 is	 that,	 in	 the	 current	 cases,	 the	universal	 generalization	 involved—	
(EO+)	 or	 (¬EO–)—is	 an	 immediate	 conceptual	 essentialist	 principle.	 For	 this	 has	 the	 following	
consequence.	The	relevant	minor	premise—H+a	or	H–a—semantically	implies	the	consequent	of	
the	 relevant	 major	 premise—∀y(Oay	 →	 !Oay)	 or	 ∀y(Oay	 →	 ¬!Oay)—in	 an	 epistemically	
distinctive	 way:	 failure	 to	 recognise	 the	 implication	 indicates	 (ceteris	 paribus)	 failure	 of	




	 The	 point	 generalizes	 to	 other	 valid	 deductions	 whose	 universal	 generalisations	 are	
immediate	 conceptual	 truths.	 Suppose	 that	 our	 concept	 <vixen>	 encodes	 the	 (immediate	
conceptual)	 principle	 that	 all	 vixens	 are	 female	 animals.	 For	 reasons	 parallel	 to	 those	 above,	
explicit	knowledge	of	 that	principle	would	play	no	role	 in	my	acquiring	knowledge,	of	a	given	
vixen,	 that	 it	 is	 a	 female	 animal.	 The	 ultimate	 reason:	 given	 the	 application	 conditions	 of	 the	
concept	<vixen>,	if	I	am	to	acquire	first-hand	knowledge	that	the	animal	in	front	of	me	is	a	vixen	
























	 The	 point	 does	not	 generalize	 to	 valid	 deductions	whose	 universal	 generalisations	 are	 not	
conceptual	 truths.17	 If	 I	 know	 that	 (all)	 squirrels	 (happen	 to)	 have	 twenty-two	 teeth,	 and	 if	 a	
squirrel	that	I’ve	been	able	to	recognize	as	such	on	the	basis	of	conceptual	competence	crosses	
my	way,	 I’m	 thereby	 in	 a	 position	 to	 acquire	 knowledge	 that	 it	 has	 twenty-two	 teeth.	 So	 the	
point	 is	 not—and	 should	 not	 be	 mistaken	 for—a	 general	 point	 against	 the	 possibility	 of	
acquiring	knowledge	by	means	of	deductive	reasoning.	The	point	is	rather	that,	when	∀x(Px	→	
Qx)	 is	 an	 immediate	 conceptual	 truth,	 one	 cannot	 acquire	 knowledge	 of	 Qa	 by	 means	 of	
deductive	 reasoning	 that	 exploits	 knowledge	 of	 that	 generalization	 and	 of	 Pa.	 In	 such	 cases,	
knowledge	of	 the	universal	generalization	does	nothing	 to	 improve	our	epistemic	 situation	 in	
relation	to	the	project	of	acquiring	knowledge	as	to	whether	Qa	(for	a	given	a).	Knowledge	of	Qa	
should	 be	 acquired	 independently	 of	 our	 knowledge	 of	∀x(Px	→	 Qx)	 and,	 arguably,	 as	 a	pre-
condition	 to	 knowing	 whether	 a	 is	 P;	 given	 that	 being	 Q	 is	 a	 condition	 for	 the	 correct	
applicability	of	<P>	that	enters	its	possession	conditions.		
	 Now,	 in	general,	 if	knowledge	of	X	 (in	 the	example,	of	 (EO+)	and	(¬EO–))	does	not	 improve	
our	epistemic	situation	with	respect	 to	acquiring	knowledge	as	 to	whether	Y	(in	 the	example,	
whether	a’s	origins	are	essential	to	her),	the	task	of	elucidating	the	knowability	conditions	of	Y	
will	 not	 be	 eased	 by	 there	 being	 an	 elucidation	 of	 the	 knowability	 conditions	 of	 X	 at	 our	
disposal.	The	current	case	is	no	exception	to	the	general	claim.	As	a	result,	an	elucidation	of	how	
we	 (can)	 know	 whether	 <human+>	 or	 <human–>	 applies	 to	 a	 certain	 known-to-be-human*-
individual	 cannot	 profit	 from	 our	 explicit	 access	 to	 (EO+)	 or	 (¬EO–).	 Consequently,	 when	 it	
comes	 to	 elucidating	 (non-conceptual)	 particular	 essentialist	 knowledge,	 the	 modal	

























human*	 individuals.	 Given	 that	a	was	 known	 to	 be	 human*,	 the	 paragraphs	 above	 show	 also	
that	 knowledge	of	 the	 conceptual	 (EO+)	 and	 (¬EO–)	does	not	 improve	our	 epistemic	 situation	





that	 knowledge	 of	 (EO+)	 and	 (¬EO–)	 does	 not	 improve	 either	 our	 epistemic	 situation	 with	
respect	to	acquiring	knowledge	as	to	whether	(EO*)	or	(¬EO*)	is	true.	As	before,	given	that	our	
epistemic	 situation	with	 respect	 to	 those	projects	 is	not	 improved	by	our	knowledge	of	 (EO+)	
and	(¬EO–),	an	elucidation	of	how	we	(can)	know	the	non-conceptual	(EO*)	and	(¬EO*)	cannot	
profit	 from	the	 fact	 that	we	have	available	an	elucidation	of	 the	knowability	conditions	of	 the	
conceptual	principles.	This	concludes	the	third	case:	the	explanatory	power	does	not	reach	non-
conceptual	essentialist	principles	either.		
	 Our	 remaining	 case	 is	 that	 of	de	 re	possibilities.	 The	most	 obvious	way	 in	which	 (explicit)	
general	 essentialist	 knowledge	 could	 assist	 us	 in	 acquiring	 knowledge	 of	 de	 re	 possibilities	
would	be	by	means	of	what	I	called	in	§1	‘a	mirroring	epistemology	of	modality’,	also	referred	to	













Let	me	 now	 generalize	 beyond	 our	 running-example.	 Even	 if	we	 had	 a	 huge	 stock	 of	general	
modally	 loaded	 concepts—something	 I	 remain	 neutral	 on—explicit	 knowledge	 of	 the	
(associated)	conceptual	essentialist	principles	we	could	arrive	at	by	reflection	on	 them	would	
not	help	us	much	vis-à-vis	the	agenda	of	the	modal	epistemologist.	As	a	result,	a	comprehensive	
epistemology	 of	 modality	 will	 make	 limited	 use	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 such	 conceptual	 essentialist	
principles	can	be	elucidated	in	a	concept-based	fashion.		
	 The	scope	of	this	limitation	can	be	stressed	by	noting	that	elucidating	our	epistemic	access	(if	
we	enjoy	 it)	 to	non-conceptual	essentialist	principles,	 to	 (non-conceptual)	particular	essential	
truths,	 and	 to	 (non-conceptual)	 de	 re	 possibilities	 are	 among	 the	 hardest	 tasks	 in	 modal	
epistemology.	And	also	by	noting	that,	if	we	possessed	modally	loaded	concepts	like	<human+>,	
the	hardest	tasks	would	also	include	that	of	elucidating	how	can	we	know	to	which	entities,	if	to	
any,	 such	 concepts	 apply.	 Recognizing	 that	 an	 entity	 falls	 under	 <human*>	 would	 still	 fall	
pressingly	short	of	that	knowledge.	
	 Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 some	might	 have	dreamt	 of	 the	 tandem,	 one	 cannot	 have	both	 of	 the	
following:	 (i)	 Essentiality	 of	 Origins	 for	 Humans	 is	 a	 priori	 knowable	 due	 to	 the	 nature	 of	
<human>;	 and	 (ii)	 a	 is	 human	 is	 a	 non-modal	 fact.	 Thus,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 general	 modally	






The	 generalization	 above	 is	 in	 itself	 a	 substantial	 result.	 More	 often	 than	 not,	 rationalist	
epistemologies	 of	 modality	 defend	 the	 (fundamental)	 apriority	 of	 modal	 knowledge	 by	
endorsing	 the	 apriority	 of	 general	 essentialist	 principles.19	 The	 exact	 source	 of	 this	 apriority,	
however,	 is	 not	 sufficiently	 articulated.	 But	 we	 can	 say	 that	 either	 these	 (alleged)	 a	 priori	
principles	are	so	because	they	are—or	are	derivable	from—immediate	conceptual	truths,	or	not.	
If	 not,	 the	 burden	 is	 on	 such	 rationalist	 epistemologies:	 they	 should	 explain	 on	 exactly	what	






                                                      
19	For	a	sample,	see	Peacocke	(1999,	168-169),	Chalmers	(2002,	194),	and	Soames	(2006,	293).	
20 See for instance (Hale	2013,	271) 
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	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 scrutinize	 the	 idea	 that	 singular	 modally	 loaded	 concepts	 are	 another	
potential	 source	 of	 concept-based	 modal	 knowledge.	 Above	 I	 distinguished	 conceptual	 from	
non-conceptual	essentialist	principles.	The	(hypothetical)	existence	of	singular	modally	loaded	
concepts	 makes	 me	 now	 distinguish	 conceptual	 essential	 truths	 about	 particular	 individuals	
from	non-conceptual	such	truths.	However,	the	case	of	singular	concepts	must	be	handled	with	
more	 care.	 In	 particular,	 the	 step	 from	 there	 being	 conceptual	 essential	 truths	 (about	 a	








vacuously	 true.	The	phenomenon	that,	 in	 the	case	of	singular	concepts,	corresponds	to	that	of	
lack	of	 instantiation	 (in	 the	 case	of	 general	 concepts),	 is	emptiness.	 And	here,	 ignorance	 as	 to	









I	 will	 focus	 here	 on	 two	 (hypothetical)	 conceptual	 networks,	 CN1	 and	 CN2,	 which,	 under	
certain—modal	 and	 existential—assumptions,	 would	 have	 enough	 expressive	 power	 to	
generate	 conceptual	 essential	 truths	 about	 particular	 individuals.	 Those	 truths	 are	 therefore	
candidates	 to	being,	 in	Boghossian’s	 terms	(1996),	epistemically	analytic	 (where	something	 is	










so	when	 grasp	 of	 its	meaning	 can	 suffice	 for	 justified	 belief	 in	 its	 truth),	 and	 the	 target	 is	 to	
identify	the	respective	two	sets	of	sufficient	conditions	for	them	being	so.		
	
The	case	of	CN1.	 Let	CN1	be	a	conceptual	network	 that	 includes	 the	 following	modally	 loaded	
singular	concept	SC1	(and	that	is	otherwise	as	similar	as	possible	to	our	conceptual	network):		
SC1	=	 <the	person	individuated	by	«originating	from	the	human	zygote	z»>22	
SC1	 is	modally	 loaded	 due	 to	 the	modal	 load	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 individuation	 (and	 cognates):	 a	
property	P	is	individuative	of	individual	x	if	an	only	if	instantiation	of	P	is	both	essential	to	x	and	
sufficient	 for	 x’s	 existence.	 Unlike	 <the	 happy	 person>,	 which,	 if	 non-defective	 as	 a	 singular	
concept,	 is	 only	 contingently	non-defective	 (for	 there	 could	be	more	 than	one	happy	person),	
SC1	 is	 guaranteed	 to	 be	 non-defective	 as	 a	 singular	 concept.23	 Yet,	 its	 (guaranteed)	 non-
defectiveness	is	no	guarantee	of	its	non-emptiness:	it	could	be	that	there	is	nothing	individuated	
by	 the	 property	 that	 SC1	makes	 reference	 to.	 Even	 if	 there	 were	 a	 person,	 a,	 that	 satisfied	
«originating	 from	 the	 human	 zygote	 z»,	 that	would	 not	 yet	 suffice	 (epistemic	 ‘suffice’)	 for	 the	
non-emptiness	 of	 SC1.	 For	 it	 might	 be	 possible	 for	 a	 to	 originate	 somehow	 else,	 or	 (non-
exclusive	‘or’)	it	might	be	possible	that	some	entity	other	than	a	instantiates	«originating	from	
the	 human	 zygote	 z».	 If	 the	 former,	 this	 property	 is	 not	 essential	 to	 a	 and,	 if	 the	 latter,	 its	
instantiation	is	not	sufficient	for	a’s	existence.	In	neither	case	would	the	property	«originating	
from	the	human	zygote	z»	be	an	individuative	one.		
	 The	 potential	 emptiness	 of	modally	 loaded	 (non-defective)	 singular	 concepts	 is,	 as	 I	 shall	
motivate,	the	reason	why	certain	immediate	conceptual	truths	(about	particular	individuals)	are	
nonetheless	 not	 conceptually	 knowable.	 In	 Boghossian’s	 terms	 (1996,	 2003),	 they	 are	 not	
epistemically	analytic	(despite	conceptual	truths!).	Let	me	start	unfolding	the	case.		
	 Take	any	property,	ψ,	such	that	the	following	is	an	immediate	conceptual	truth:	
(a)		 <∀x(x	 =	 the	 person	 individuated	 by	 «originating	 from	 the	 human	 zygote	 z»	→	 x	 is	
essentially	ψ)>	
Thinkers	possessing	SC1	 (in	virtue	of	possessing	CN1)	are	arguably	 in	a	position	 to	know	any	
true	instance	of	(a).	For	example,	as	potential	candidates	(on	whose	plausibility	I	do	not	need	to	
take	a	view):		







(a1)		 <∀x(x	 =	 the	 person	 individuated	 by	 «originating	 from	 the	 human	 zygote	 z»	→	 x	 is	
essentially	a	living	being)>	
(a2)		 <∀x(x	 =	 the	 person	 individuated	 by	 «originating	 from	 the	 human	 zygote	 z»	→	 x	 is	
essentially	a	human	being)>	









(b2)	 <The	 person	 individuated	 by	 «originating	 from	 the	 human	 zygote	 z»	 is	 essentially	 a	
human	being>	
(b3)	 <The	 person	 individuated	 by	 «originating	 from	 the	 human	 zygote	 z»	 essentially	
originates	from	z>	
What	 else	 is	 required	 for	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 (b)-thoughts?	 There	 is	 a	 natural	 possible	 answer	
congenial	to,	for	instance,	classical	logic	and	there	is	a	less	(obviously-)natural	answer	congenial	
to	 free	 logic.	 As	 for	 the	 former:	 some—Hale	 and	 Wright	 (2009)	 among	 them—require	 in	
addition	that	the	singular	concept	(in	the	subject	position)	in	the	(b)-thoughts	be	non-empty.	As	
for	the	latter:	others—Fine	(2005)	among	them—think	that	it	is	only	required	that	the	singular	
concept	 be	possibly	non-empty.	 If	 SC1	 is	 empty	 yet	 possibly	 non-empty,	 the	 (b)-thoughts	 are	
transcendent	truths,	but	 truths	all	 the	same.24	Despite	their	disagreement	on	truth	conditions,	
the	two	answers	converge	in	that	knowledge	of	the	(a)-thoughts	does	not	suffice	to	put	us	in	a	
position	 to	 know—let	 alone	 conceptually—any	 of	 the	 (b)-thoughts.	 I	 contend	 that,	 for	
conceptual	 knowledge	 of	 the	 (b)-thoughts	 above,	 the	 conceptual	 knowability	 of	 the	 non-
emptiness	 (Hale	 and	Wright)	 or	 of	 the	possible	 non-emptiness	 (Fine)	 of	 SC1	would	 be	 needed	
too.25	












With	 this	 stock,	 I	 can	 identify	 the	 first	 set	 of	 sufficient	 conditions	 for	 conceptual	 essentialist	
knowledge	 about	 particular	 individuals.	 The	disagreement	 as	 to	what	 else	 is	 required	 for	 the	
truth	of	the	(b)-thoughts	will	give	us	two	variants	of	this	first	set:	the	Hale&Wright-variant,	and	
the	 Fine-variant,	 which	 I	 shall	 nonetheless	 introduce	 simultaneously.	 If,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	
conceptually	 true	 (and	 arguably	 epistemically	 analytic)	 (a)-propositions,	 (c1)	 [or	 else	 (c2)]	
were	also	conceptually	 true	(and	knowable	on	this	basis),	 then,	access	to	(c1)	[or	else	to	(c2)]	
could	be	employed	in	reasoning	to	obtain	conceptual	knowledge	of	the	(b)-propositions;	that	is,	
to	 obtain	 conceptual	 knowledge	 about	 the	 person	 [whether	 actual	 or	 merely	 possible]	
individuated	by	 the	property	«originating	 from	 the	human	zygote	 z».	Now,	one	might	want	 to	
insist	 that	 such	 knowledge,	 due	 to	 its	 inferential	 nature,	 would	 not	 be	 purely	 conceptual	
knowledge.	Yet,	it	would	be	close	enough	to	it	to	still	deserve	the	label	‘conceptual’.	For	it	would	





	 Before	 that,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 draw	 the	 following	 distinctions	 to	 prevent	 confusion	 about	
what	exactly	my	claims	will	be.	There	are	three	notions	the	difference	among	which	I	want	to	
stress:	 (i)	 conceptual	 essential	 truth	 about	 a	 particular	 individual;	 (ii)	 conceptual	 essentialist	
knowledge	 about	 a	 particular	 individual;	 (iii)	 knowledge	 (whether	 conceptual	 or	 not)	 of	 a	
conceptual	 essential	 truth	 about	 a	 particular	 individual.	 Continuing	 with	 our	 example	 above,	
























The	 case	 of	 CN2.	 Let	 CN2	 be	 a	 conceptual	 network	 that	 includes	 a	 (non-defective)	 singular	
concept,	<C>,	such	that	it	 is	a	conceptual	truth	(if	true)	that	the	property	by	means	of	which	it	







As	 before,	 the	 existence	 of	 <C>	 does	 not	 guarantee	 its	 non-emptiness.	 Here,	 there	 are	 two	
(salient)	potential	 sources	of	emptiness:	 (i)	 the	(uniqueness)	essential	property	might	 lack	an	
























instance;	and	(ii)	 there	might	be	no	(uniqueness)	essential	property	 to	 feed	a	value	 for	<C>.30	
The	discussion	below—as	I	shall	make	clear—subsumes	both	potential	sources	of	emptiness.	
	 Abstractionism	 provides	 an	 illuminating	 CN2-example.	 Think	 of	 <C>	 as	 the	 concept	 <the	
number	 of	 <being	 Zero>>,	 as	 forged	 by	 means	 of	 Hume’s	 Principle;	 and	 think	 of	 its	









of	 <C>	 is	 not	 per	 se	 sufficient—not	 even	 in	 combination	 with	 conceptual	 knowledge	 of	 the	
conceptually	true,	if	true,	(a4)—to	put	us	in	a	position	to	conceptually	know	any	of	(b4)	or	(b5).	




We	 now	 have	 enough	 stock	 to	 identify	 the	 second	 set	 of	 sufficient	 conditions	 for	 conceptual	
essentialist	 knowledge	 about	 particular	 individuals.	 As	 above,	 there	 is	 a	Hale&Wright-variant	
and	a	Fine-variant	which	I	introduce	simultaneously.	If	we	could	have	conceptual	knowledge	of	


















(a4),	 and	 if	 (c3)	 [or	 else	 (c4)]	 were	 also	 conceptually	 true	 and	 knowable	 on	 this	 basis,	 then,	
access	to	(c3)	[or	else	to	(c4)],	plus	possession	of	<C>,	could	be	employed	in	reasoning	to	obtain	
conceptual	 knowledge	 of	 (b4)	 and	 (b5);	 that	 is,	 to	 obtain	 conceptual	 essentialist	 knowledge	
about	 the	 unique	 entity	 (possibly)	 picked	 out	 by	 «being	 the	 number	 of	 <being	 Zero>».	 Again,	
some	might	 insist	 that	 such	knowledge	would	not	be	purely	conceptual	 (due	 to	 its	 inferential	
nature).	Yet,	for	the	reasons	given	earlier,	it	would	still	deserve	the	label	‘conceptual’.		
	 (This,	as	anticipated,	subsumes	both	potential	sources	of	emptiness.	For	knowledge	of	 (c3)	
or	of	 (c4)	 requires	not	only	 the	 (possible)	existence	of	a	witness	 for	 the	existential	 claim,	but	
also	 that	 the	 predicative	 concept	 <ϕ>	 refers;	 in	 our	 example:	 <being	 the	 number	 of	 <being	
Zero>>.	The	requirement	that	predicative	concepts	refer	was	also	in	place	in	the	CN1-example.	I	















I	 contend	 that	 they	 cannot	 be	 known	on	 conceptual	 grounds.	Perhaps,	 for	 any	 coherent,	non-
modally	loaded	predicative	concept	<ϕ>,	we	can	know	a	priori	that	<◊∃x(ϕx)>.	For	instance—as	
my	 best	 shot	 at	 finding	 a	 likely	 example—one	 could	 appeal	 to	 the	 apriority	 of	 a	 principle	 of	
recombination	to	get	also	the	apriority	of	<it	is	possible	that	there	is	a	talking	donkey>.	A	priori	











perhaps,	 but	 hardly	 conceptual	 knowledge.	 Now,	 if	 the	 (c)-thoughts	 involved	 non-modally	
loaded	predicative	concepts	(as	components	of	the	singular	concepts),	I	would	have	said	enough	
to	 settle	 the	 Fine-case.36	 But	 they	 do	 not:	 <individuation>	 is	 a	 modal	 notion,	 and	 the	
abstractionist’s	<number>	is	a	sortal,	essentially	loaded	concept.	Generalizing:	by	the	nature	of	
the	case,	any	other	(c)-thought	will	 involve	modal	notions.	As	a	result,	what	 I	have	said	so	 far	
does	 not	 seem	 to	 cover	 the	 (c)-thoughts.	 However,	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 involve	modally	 loaded	
predicative	 concepts	 can	only	make	 it	more	persuasive	 that	 epistemic	 grounds	 for	 these	 ◊∃x-
thoughts	cannot	be	conceptual.	For	even	if	they	could	be	known	a	priori	somehow,	an	a	priori	
principle	 of	 recombination	would	 not	 suffice.	 Something	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 certain	 categorical	
properties	 are	 essential	 to	 their	 bearers	 would	 be	 needed	 in	 addition.	 (For	 example:	 that	
properties	 of	 biological	 origins	 are	 essential	 to	 their	 bearers.)	 And	 the	 epistemic	 grounds	 for	
this	extra	needed	thing	can	hardly	be,	as	per	§2.1,	conceptual	either.	37	
	 I	anticipated	just	before	§3.1	that	the	reasons	offered	against	the	claim	that	CN1	or	CN2	allow	
for	 conceptual	 essentialist	 knowledge	 about	 particular	 individuals	 will	 be	 generalizable.	 The	
reasons	offered	in	this	subsection	are	in	fact	general	reasons,	which	I	have	illustrated	by	means	
of	 the	 examples	 stemming	 from	 CN1	 and	 CN2.	 The	 general	 conclusion	 is	 that,	 regardless	 of	
where	(within	a	conceptual	network)	the	modal	load	of	a	singular	modally	loaded	concept	<C>	
stems	 from,	 conceptual	 knowledge	 that	 a	 thought	 about	 C	 is	 true	 requires	 the	 conceptual	
knowability	that	C	exists	or	could	exist.	But	that	is	not	conceptually	knowable.	As	a	result,	there	
is	no	room	for	conceptual	essentialist	knowledge	about	particular	individuals.	And	this	is	so	even	
if	 there	 is	room,	as	 I	am	granting	and	 indeed	motivating,	 for	conceptual	essential	 truths	about	





for	 the	 claim	 that,	 in	 some	 cases,	 there	might	 be	 a	hybrid	 surrogate	 that	would	 still	 render	a	













Hale	 and	 Wright’s	 surrogate	 concerns	 a	 restricted	 class	 of	 (c)-thoughts:	 those	 about	 the	
abstractionist’s	abstracta;	that	is,	about	abstract	objects	singular	concepts	for	which	have	been	
forged	 by	 means	 of	 (good)	 abstraction	 principles.	 The	 story	 is	 dense,	 but	 a	 watered-down	
version	 of	 it	 suffices	 for	 current	 purposes.	 According	 to	 them,	 we	 are	 entitled	 to	 abstraction	
principles	being	good.38	When	an	abstraction	principle—(∀a)(∀b)(Σ(a)	=	Σ(b)	↔	E(a,	b))—is	in	






It	 grounds	 the	 ∃x-thoughts	 because	 the	 truth	 of	 ┌Σ(a)	 =	 Σ(b)┐	 requires—according	 to	
Hale&Wright	(e.g.,	2009)—the	existence	of	referents	for	the	singular	terms.	It	grounds	the	◊∃x-
thoughts	 because	 they	 are	 implied	 by	 the	 so-grounded	 ∃x-thoughts	 and	 arguably	 known	 on	
those	bases.	 	
	 A	priori	knowledge	of	existential	claims	about	the	abstractionists’	abstracts,	therefore,	flows	




are	 female—and	 inferential	 knowledge	 that	 still	 deserves	 the	 label	 ‘conceptual’	 because	 it	 is	
knowledge	 arrived	 at	 deductively	 from	 only	 purely	 conceptual	 knowledge.	 On	 the	 current	
rationalist	 model,	 knowledge	 of	 (b5)	 falls	 under	 none	 of	 these	 categories,	 for	 this	 piece	 of	
knowledge	is	also,	significantly,	entitlement-based.	The	current	knowability	model	is	therefore	
hybrid	in	a	(so	far)	novel	way:	it	is	an	entitlement-and-concept-based	account.39	
















here—but	the	hybrid	nature	of	 the	model	should	not	be	worrying	per	se.	 If	correct,	 the	model	
can	 explain	a	priori	knowledge	of	 (b5)	 in	 a	way	 that	 still	 appears	 significantly	 concept-based.	
The	 dialectic	 so	 far	 is	 worth	 stressing	 though.	 We	 saw	 in	 §2	 that	 general	 modally	 loaded	
concepts	won’t	get	us	very	far.	And	we’ve	seen	from	§3	that	singular	modally	loaded	concepts	
won’t	 get	 us	 far	 either,	 unless	 something	 in	 addition	 to	 considerations	 on	 the	 nature	 of	
concepts—e.g.,	entitlements—kicks	in.	Despite	the	fact	that	hybridity	is	not	worrying	per	se—I	
remain	 neutral	 about	 the	 abstractionist’s	 epistemology40—I	 find	 it	 important	 to	 identify	 and	
stress	 the	 necessarily	 hybrid	 nature	 of	 any	 potentially	 correct	 concept-based	 epistemology	 of	
essence.41	For	that,	I	contend,	has	been	overlooked.		
	
As	 anticipated	 above,	 however,	 this	 model	 cannot	 be	 extended	 beyond	 the	 abstractionist’s	
abstracta.	 For,	 as	 Hale	 and	 Wright	 stress,42	 abstraction,	 even	 when	 using	 apparently	
concreteness-entailing	properties,	will	 forge	abstracta	concepts.	 It	addition,	those	who	are	not	
inclined	to	abstractionism	to	begin	with,	will	not	do	much	with	the	epistemology	of	modality	it	





on	 the	basis	of	what	 the	discussion	has	 taught	us	so	 far;	 that	any	potentially	 correct	 concept-
based	epistemology	of	essence	will	need	to	be	hybrid.	It	develops	from	the	thought	that	perhaps	
entitlements,	 differently	 employed,	 might	 engender	 a	 more	 general	 (and	 theory-neutral)	



















Provided	 I	 know	 of	 the	 (possible)	 existence	 of	 z,	 knowledge	 of	 (c2)	 can	 flow	 quite	
straightforwardly	from	the	entitlement	to	that	property	being	an	individual	essence.45	Provided	
I	also	know	(presumably	empirically)	 that	something	 instantiates	 that	property—assumed	for	
simplicity	 to	 be	 categorical—knowledge	 of	 (c1)	 would	 also	 be	 grounded	 partly	 in	 such	
entitlement.46	
	 Like	 the	 abstractionist	 model,	 what	 the	 current	 proposal	 delivers	 is	 entitlement-based	
knowledge	 of	 the	 (c)-thoughts.	 On	 this	 basis,	 and	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 concept-based	
knowledge	of	the	(a)-thoughts,	we	could	arrive	at	knowledge	of	the	corresponding	(b)-thoughts	








(c1),	(a1)	 (b1)	 <The	person	 individuated	by	«originating	 from	human	zygote	z»	
is	essentially	a	living	being>	
The	 cases	 of	 (b2)	 and	 (b3)	 would	 unfold	 analogously.	 (b1)-(b3)	 are	 what	 we	 called	 in	 §3.1	
conceptual	 essential	 truths	about	 a	particular	 individual	 and,	 on	 this	proposal,	 they	 are	partly	
grounded	 in	entitlements	plus,	 in	 some	sense	 to	be	specified	 in	§5,	 conceptual	 truths;	namely,	




















This	 paper	 is	 an	 exploration	 of	 the	 prospects	 of	 rationalist	 concept-based	 epistemologies	 of	
essence.	 I	 started	 the	 exploration	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 explanatory	 potential	 of	modally	 loaded	
concepts	(general	or	singular),	then	focusing	on	the	abstractionist’s	hybrid	model,	to	end	up	in	
the	 current	 (more	 theory-neutral)	 proposal.	With	 all	 this	 stock,	 I	 shall	 now	argue	 that,	 to	 get	
enough	explanatory	power,	a	concept-based	account	has	had	to	metamorphose	to	a	degree	such	
that	‘concept-based’	would	be	a	misnomer.	The	reasoning	is	two-fold.		
	 ‘Concept-based’	 would	 be	 a	misnomer.	 As	 just	 recalled,	 (b1)-(b3)	 are	 conceptual	 particular	
truths.	But,	exploiting	the	different	notions	distinguished	in	§3.1,	knowledge	of	them	does	not,	
in	 any	 significant	 sense,	 amount	 to	 conceptual	 knowledge	 of	 them.	 Claims	 (1)	 and	 (2)	 from	
above	 are,	 together	 with	 (a1),	 equally	 sufficient	 to	 ground	 essentialist	 knowledge	 about	 the	






(1),	(2),	(a1)	 (b1)*	<The	 person	 who	 originates	 from	 the	 human	 zygote	 z	 is	
essentially	a	living	being>	
The	difference	between	(b1)	and	(b1)*	is	one	of	mode	of	presentation	of	the	individual	they	are	
about.	 Now,	 in	 the	 process	 of	 getting	 each	 of	 (b1)	 and	 (b1)*	we	 used	 conceptual	 knowledge;	
namely	an	(a)-thought.	There	is	therefore	a	sense	in	which	any	of	them	can	be	said	to	be	concept	
based.	 It	 is	 a	 rather	weak	 sense,	 however.	 For,	what	 is	 doing	 the	 crucial	work	 is	 the	already	
essentialist	 entitlement	 that	 a	 certain	 property	 is	 an	 individual	 essence;	 which	 semantically	
implies	both	that	 it	 is	an	essential	property	and	that	 it	 is	a	sufficiency	property.	Knowledge	of	












antecedent	 knowledge	 of	 <Hume	 was	 born	 in	 Scotland>	 and	 <Mill	 was	 born	 in	 England>,	 is	
equally	weakly	concept-based;	the	former	is	based	on	<individuation>,	the	latter	on	<and>.	
	
The	 generalization	 that	 supports	 the	 ‘has	 had	 to’.	 I	 said	 that	 the	 proposal	 has	 had	 to	
metamorphose	to	a	degree	such	that	‘concept-based’	would	be	a	misnomer.	The	modal	force	is	
needed	 to	 support	 the	 intended	 general	 conclusion	 that	 concepts	 have	 a	 very	 limited	 role	 to	
play	in	the	epistemology	of	modality.	Let	me	then	justify	the	modal	force:	in	§2,	I	explained	why	
the	 explanatory	 power	 of	 general,	modally	 loaded	 concepts	 leaves	 a	 lot	 unexplained.	 In	 §3,	 I	
showed	 why	 singular,	 modally	 loaded	 concepts	 cannot	 fill	 the	 explanatory	 gap.	 Purely	
conceptual	 grounds,	 therefore,	 do	 not	 get	 us	 far.48	 §4	 started	 by	 considering	 a	 hybrid—
entitlement-	and	concept	based—approach	that	applies	at	most	to	the	abstractionist’s	abstracts.	
We	got	 inspiration	 from	there	 to	 flirt	with	a	different	entitlement-based	view	that,	not	only	 is	
more	 theory	 neutral,	 but	 also	 can	 be	made	 as	 general	 as	 one	 deems	 appropriate.	Modulo	 the	
solving	of	the	internal	drawbacks,	the	current	entitlement-based	proposal	might	have	a	chance	
to	 close	 the	 identified	 explanatory	 gap.	 Entitlements,	 in	 this	 proposal,	 however,	 can	 be	
abstracted	 away	 from	 the	 role	 they	 play.	 One	might	want	 to	 close	 the	 gap	 somehow	 else:	 by	
rational	 insight;	 by	 somehow-else-grounded	 a	 priori	 knowledge	 of	 which	 properties	 are	
essential	 [or	 else	 individuative];	 by	 empirically	 elucidated	 essentialist	 knowledge;	 etc.	 One	
might	even	go	for	a	combination	of	those	options,	thereby	embracing	the	increasingly	popular	





particular	 individuals	 are	 not	 satisfiable	 even	 in	 the	 less	 demanding	 Fine-case.	 There,	 I	
explained	 why	 not	 even	 knowledge—a	 priori	 or	 not—of	 a	 principle	 of	 recombination	 would	
suffice.	What	was	needed	 is	something	that—as	the	entitlements	would	contribute	 to	doing—
guides	us	 in	 telling	apart	 the	essential	 from	the	non-essential	properties	 (or	 the	 individuative	
from	 the	 non-individuative	 ones)	 among	 the	 categorical	 ones.	 This	 is	 nearly	 the	 whole	
explanandum	still	awaiting	an	explanation.*	
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